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Summary
This paper is devoted to assessment of policy mix impacts regarding nitogen pollutants.
The analysed policy combines a tax on the nitrogen input and incentives promoting perennial
crops assumed to be low input ones. We show that perennial crop subsidy increases signiﬁcantly
the tax eﬃciency, compatible with the balanced budget of the Regulatory Agency in charge of
the environment. Based on a MILP agricultural supply model, quantitative analysis provides
assessment of impacts regarding land use, farmers income, and N losses at the North France
level.
Keywords: Bio-economic model; mathematical linear programming; environmental policy
mix; N-fertilizer tax; bio-energy support;
1 Introduction
Agricultural production is well known for having negative externalities such as nitrate losses and
GreenHouse Gases (GHG) emissions. Indeed, the intensiﬁcation of cropping systems and the in-
crease of livestock density have pushed the rise of nitrate concentration in soils as well as the GHG
emissions.To regulate these phenomena, and in particular the nitrate contend of watersheds, several
European Directives and policies have been implemented. The two main ones are (i) the "Water
Directive", dealing with the water quality conservation in major reserves by reducing or eliminat-
ing pollutant losses and emissions, and (ii) the "Nitrogen Directive" focusing on the water quality
protection by preventing the N-pollution from the agricultural sector (mineral fertilizer and live-
stock manure) through a set of good agricultural practices (especially about N-input consumption).
These tools interfere indirectly with the "Biofuel Directive" which promotes the use of energy crops.
Among them, the perennial biomass crops, like the miscanthus, have fewer environmental impacts
thanks to their lower fertilizer inputs and their less intensive farming practices.
The N-pollution issue is one of the main agricultural negative externalities. Numerous papers
showed the low eﬃciency of the N-loss regulation such as the N-tax. Indeed, this second best is-
sue remains pretty diﬃcult to solve regarding the real world. This is partly due to the number of
agents involved in the environmental process, to the spatial heterogeneity of agents and impacts,
and to the intricate system of public policies leading to a wide range of interferences. However,
by adding other instruments to the N-tax, like land use policy and biofuel support, we lead to
relevant policies. Regarding our paper, we focus on the comparison of the impacts of two kinds
of agricultural policy schemes aiming to decrease the nitrogen pollutant losses. First, we examine
the implementation of usual policy tools like the N-tax on mineral fertilizers. In the context of
encouraging environmental-friendly crop production, we then analyze the impact of an agricultural
subsidy scheme assigned to a perennial biomass crop: the miscanthus. The miscanthus was chosen
for two reasons: i) the existence of literature information, leading us to retain high biomass yields
under European climatic-ecological conditions and ii) the claimed low-input request and the high
quality regarding the transformation into energy (Lewandowski and Schmidt, 2005). Our method-
ology uses the agricultural supply model AROPAj. This mathematical linear programming model
was built to cover the European Union by the way of a large set of representative farm groups.
2These farm groups are representative at the regional scale. Our study should be ﬁrst devoted to an
area under charge of a Water Agency, like the Seine river basin. In this paper we enlarge the area
untill 14 Regions of the north of France. In the model, there are 99 farm types grouped into these
14 regions. A large set of activities are covered (ﬁeld crops, grasslands, set-aside, animal produc-
tion). Each farm group is related to one mathematical programming model and data are mainly
provided by the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). A coupling of AROPAj with the crop
growth model STICS is proceeded in order to estimate the nitrogen response functions describing
the relation the yield and the N-losses. Concerning the introduction of the perennial activity in the
model, some improvements are required, like the ’ﬁx use’ of the land which can be easily introduced
in our annual modelling. The diﬃculty comes with the computation of the Net Present Value of
the miscanthus. The determination of this value is based on "the Faustmann" principle used in the
case of perennial crop with annual harvest. The generic function of natural increase used in this
level is calibrated on few data available from the works of Miguez et al. (2008), Clifton-Brown et al.
(2007), and Christian et al. (2008) and adjusted to the average yield of traditional annual crop such
as wheat.
2 Methodology
2.1 The AROPAj model description
The AROPAj model, developed by INRA, is a one-period mixed integer mathematical programming
model able to take into account the technical aspects of the agricultural production. Based on
a micro-economic approach (Arﬁni, 2001), AROPAj describes the annual supply choices of the
European farmers in term of surface allocation, animal production and on-farm consumption of
grains and forrages. Farmers are grouped into farm types according to: the farm techno-economic
orientations within its region, the farm economic size and the farm altitude class. Each farm type,
which is statistically representative of the diﬀerent production systems, is assumed to choose the
supply level and the input demand which maximize its total gross margin under several constraints:
total farm type land endowment, availability of housing and animal demography, quality of feeds
and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) measures (set-aside requirements, milk and sugar beet
quotas). Concerning the model calibration, data are mainly provided by the Farm Accountancy
Data Network (FADN). Since the creation of the AROPAj model, it was used in the study of
the successive CAP reforms (Jayet and Labonne, 2005) - McSharry, Agenda 2000 and Luxembourg
reforms - and in the analyses of the agri-environmental problems, such as the aﬀorestation (Cara and
Jayet, 2000), the GHG emissions (Cara and Jayet, 2000) and the nitrogen pollution of groundwater
aquifers.
For some years, the AROPAj model has been improved by adding dose-response functions, ones
linking the N-input and the crop yield (C. Godard) and others linking the N-input and the N-losses.
This approach, developped by (Petsakos and Jayet, 2010), considers a nitrogen balance taking into
account the nitrogen related to manure management.
2.2 Introduction of perennial crops
Miscanthus x Giganteus1 is a rhizomatous grass which comes originally from the tropics and sub-
tropics, but is found under diﬀerent species throughout a wide climatic range in East Asia (?).
The remarkable adaptability of miscanthus to diﬀerent environment (Numata, 1974) makes it suit-
able for establishment and distribution under European and North American climatic conditions
(Lewandowski et al., 2000). Field trials have shown the high biomass yield potential, 15 to 20
tonnes dry matter per hectare, in comparison to other herbeceous crops (Clifton-Brown and Jones,
1996; Jorgensen, 1997; Lewandowski et al., 2000). Thanks to its characteristics, it can provide good
protection against soil erosion risks and, with low input consumption, it can decrease the risk of
groundwater pollution by pesticides and nitrates.
1Miscanthus x Giganteus is a steril hybrid between M. Sinensis and M. Sacchariﬂorus.
3For the introduction of miscanthus in the AROPAj model, two elements have been calculated
for each farm-type: the Average Net Present Value (NPV ) and the average yield (Y ), both cor-
responding to the optimal rotation (T). The determination of NPV  is based on a dynamic
optimisation in time used in the case of perennial crop with annual harvest ; and a deterministic
function of natural increased is used to compute Y .
2.2.1 Determination of the generic growth function (Y (t)):
Basing on the researches of Miguez et al. (2008), Clifton-Brown et al. (2007) and Christian et al.
(2008), we build a growth model for miscanthus. Condering a as the maximum biomass yield, b
the inﬂection point in which biomass yield reaches the half of the maximum biomass yield, c the
spreading parameter and d the attenuation coeﬃcient, the model is given by the following equation:
Y (t) = [a=(1 + exp((b   t)=c)   a=(1 + exp((b)=c))]exp( dt) (1)
As shown in Figure ??, three phases are identiﬁed: i) the installation phase where the yield
increases, ii) the maturity phase where the biomass reaches its maximum and iii) the decline phase
showing the decrease of the miscanthus growth.
Figure 1: Miscanthus growth curve
2.2.2 From a dynamic approach to a static framework
To introduce miscanthus in AROPAj, we need to compute its yield level for each farm type but,
miscanthus yields are not available in the FADN database and, knowing that miscanthus crops have
been recently introduced in France, yield informations for the full rotation period (15-20 years) are
not available as well. So we suppose that miscanthus yield increases with the quality of the land,
following the wheat yield2, wheat being a traditional crop presented in the four-ﬁfths of the french
farm-type into AROPAj. This assumption is conﬁrmed in Figure ??, which shows the signiﬁcant
correlationship between the average regional yield of miscanthus (Regional yield of miscanthus data
are provided by the French Biomass Project REGIX) and the average regional yield of wheat. Then,
2Wheat yield data are provided by the FADN database.
4we proceed to an adjustment of the average miscanthus yield to the average wheat yield to identify
the level of miscanthus yield for each farm-type.
Figure 2: Correlation between the average yield of miscanthus and the average yield of wheat
2.2.3 The Net Present Value:
We suppose that miscanthus plantations are typically grown as an even-aged monoculture. Prices
and costs rise at continuous time about 1.5% per year and the discount rate  is ﬁxed at 5% for
perennial grasses in France. The establishment cost (EC) paid oﬀ over T years (rotation) in an
inﬁnite sequence, as established by Faustmann’s criterion, happens in year zero. First costs, ﬁxed
at 3000 A C/ha, is composed of: rhizome purchase cost, planting cost, cultivation cost and herbicides
cost for a weed control. Then, production costs (PC) happen one year after the establishment and
will be appealing to each T year until the inﬁnite. The latters correspond to variable costs and
include expenses made for fertilization, weed control and harvest, they are ﬁxed at 400 A C/ha/year.
To have an annual gross margin (GM) during the rotation, we consider that the crop is harvested
annually (several times) during the T years rotation. At year t, its value is obtained by multiplying
miscanthus yield, harvested at t (Y (t)) in (tDM), with its price (P), ﬁxed by Bical Biomasse France
(BBF) at 70 A C/tDM. To sum up, we have GR(t) = P  Y (t).
The NPV of miscanthus is obtained by maximizing the discounted proﬁt inﬁnite sequence, at
time t0. Therefore, the discounted value of the net income is equal to
NPV (t) = ( EC +
T X
t=2
(GR(t)exp( )   PC exp( ))exp( t)=(1   exp( T)) (2)
where  is the inﬂation rate.
3 Single policy analysis
The aim here is to study the impacts of the introduction of miscanthus on the abatement costs of the
three main N-pollutants: N20, NH3 and N03. We ﬁrst focus on comparing the eﬀects of N-fertilizer
tax on abatement costs when the farmers are allowed or not allowed to plant miscanthus. The
objective is to assess whether the introduction of miscanthus reduces abatement costs. Secondly,
in the case where miscanthus is introduced, we compare the eﬀects of two 2nd best policies (a
N-fertilizer tax and a subsidy for miscanthus) on abatement costs and land use.
3.1 Impacts of the introduction of miscanthus on abatements costs in the case
of N-fertilizer tax
The benchmark refers to the state in which the perennial crop is not implemented. We focus
here on the one-dimension policy when N-fertilizer tax is only implemented. The range of the tax
5is [0%,100%] of the N-price3. The main outcome is that the abatement costs of the three given














Figure 3: Abatement (%) in function of tax on N-fertilizer
.
Whether or not miscanthus is introduced, in both cases the tax equals marginal costs and farmers
have a tendency to abandon certain plots when the marginal costs of these plots are higher than the
tax. In the case where miscanthus is introduced, if the tax is null, the surface of miscanthus is close
to zero because the marginal proﬁt of miscanthus production is negative for most of the available
plots. However, if the tax increases, the farmers start planting miscanthus on the abandoned plots
(from 0 to 2.5 % of Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA)) when the tax increases from 0 to 100 % of
the N-price (Cf. Table 1 of the Appendix). Moreover, the share of the abandoned plots covered
by miscanthus increases with the tax. This is due to the fact that the last abandoned plots have
the highest marginal yields. We can also observe on graphics that the introduction of miscanthus
reduces the abatement costs of all three pollutants, in particular when the tax level exceeds 80
% of the N-price as miscanthus increases from 1 to 2.5 % of UAA. In addition, a distinction can
be done between lower tax levels, for which only gas pollutions see their abatement costs reduced,
and higher tax levels (> 80%), for which all N-pollutant abatement costs are signiﬁcantly reduce
(including N03).
3.2 Comparison of a N-fertilizer tax and a subsidy for miscanthus
Because a relationship seems to exist between an increase of the miscanthus area and the abatement
of N-pollutants, it is interesting to compare a N-fertilizer tax, which aﬀects input costs, with a policy
in favor of biofuels, particularly with one which provides a miscanthus subsidy (considered as an
environmental-friendly crops). Abatement of the three pollutant is evaluated for values of the
subsidy varying between 0 to 250A C/ha and for values of the tax between 0%, and 100% of the
N-price. For those values, the abatement induced by the tax is always higher. However the impact
of miscanthus subsidy on abatement is non-negligent, in particular for the N03 pollutant. Indeed,
the N03 abatement represents up to 40 percent of the N03 abatement obtained in the case of the
N-fertilizer tax (for equal abatement costs).
The miscanthus subsidy only reduces the proportion of land devoted to other croplands pro-
duction (Cf. Table 2 of the Appendix), without reducing those croplands yields (extensive eﬀect).
Taxes on intensity have a double eﬀect on agricultural production. First, taxes reduce the crop-
lands yields (because less inputs are used) and increase the proportion of land devoted to miscanthus
crops, fallow land and grassland (Cf. Table 1 of the Appendix). Secondly, taxes reduce intensity and
3The average N-mineral price is close to 1A C=kgN.













Figure 4: In the case of tax (and no subsidy): Total abatement
costs (% of benchmark revenu) in function of N-pollutant abatement
(% abatement)
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Figure 5: In the case of subsidy (and no tax): Total abatement
costs (% of benchmark revenu) in function of N-pollutant abatement
(% abatement)
thus the production level for all croplands, including those with high soil quality (intensive eﬀect).
An interesting result is that the increase of miscanthus area doesn’t imply a signiﬁcant decrease
of grassland and fallow but rather a decrease in cereals (soft wheat, maize and other cereals) and
oilseeds. The explanation comes from the Luxembourg CAP reform, where most of the subsidies
depend on the area criterion. This reform induces a land reallocation rather than a decrease of
grassland. However, even if subsidies contribute to substitute croplands by miscanthus, the impact
of the N-fertilizer tax on croplands is more important. Indeed, while miscanthus area reaches 6.7
% of UAA for a subsidy equal to 250A C/ha and 2.5% of UAA for a 100% N-tax, croplands (except
miscanthus) represent between 66% and 61.7 % of UAA in the ﬁrst case and between 66 % and 60.7
% of UAA in the second one.
To conclude, N-pollutants can be reduced by: i) decreasing N-fertilizer input use in the case of
a N-tax (intensive use) or ii) increasing subsidized environmentally-friendly crops (extensive use).
In the next section, we will focus on the combination of those two policy tools in order to achieve
a better eﬃciency.
4 Quantiﬁed impacts of the policy mix at the North of France level
In this section, we add a tax on agricultural inputs, and we study how it modiﬁes the results of this
previous section.
4.1 Impacts on abatement costs of the policy mix
We can observe that the policy mix instrument reduces the abatement costs for the three given
pollutants. As expected, results involving NO3 abatement costs are better. Indeed, for a 20%
abatement target4, the abatement costs are reduced 3 fold (3% vs 1% of revenue). For the N2O
and the NH3 abatements, the abatements costs are higher regardless the target.
The Figures 6 and 7 describe abatment cost curves for each N-pollutant under tax scheme, and
the associated horizontal curves correspond to the additional abatment under subsidies, for each
tax level. As shown on Figure 6, adding a miscanthus subsidy decreases the abatement cost of N03
(in comparison with the tax alone), especially when the input tax is high, whereas the abatement
costs of gas pollutants (N20 and NH3) increase (Cf. Figures 6 and 7).
This result is mainly due to emissions processes (interpolated as linear function of N-input), NO3-
losses having a weaker sensivity to N-input () and greater natural emissions compared to N2O
and NH3. Theses latter pollutions are thus mainly sensitive to N-input contrary to N03 leaching
mainly responding to crops area shares This is noteworthy because N03 is the pollutant for which
the abatement cost are the highest. This means that it is the pollutant with the weakest elasticity
4Goal of the Water Directive for the French Seine Bassin
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Figure 6: Abatement costs (% of revenue) in function of NO3 and
N2O abatements in policy mix
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Figure 7: Abatement costs (% of revenue) in function of NO3 and
NH3 abatements in policy mix
to decrease in N-fertilizer. So, the eﬃcient of policy mix for the N03 pollutant is the combination
of two extensive margin eﬀects: i) A land reallocation in favor of miscanthus (for which we assumed
an  weak) and ii) The elasticy of land reallocation in favor of miscanthus due to subsidy increases
with the tax on N-fertilizer (Cf. Table 3 in Appendix). In other words, the higher tax level is, the
greater miscanthus maximum area and introduction rate with subsidy level are.
On the contrary, since two other pollutants natural losses ( ) are alrealdy weak for main crops
(especially soft wheat), the land reallocation in favor of miscanthus leads to fewer additional abate-
ment in comparison to N-fertilizer tax alone.
Adding an incentive policy of perennial biomass crops with a price instrument thus increases gas
pollution abatement costs, but is of real interest for N03 pollution regulation purposes. Therefore,
a trade-oﬀ exists for the regulatory body between N03 and gas pollution control.
4.2 Budget opportunities thanks to the policy mix
In this section we focus on the NO3 pollutant, which is under the charge of local or Regional Water
Agencies directly responsible of their budget. This Public Body is interested in the consequences
of the policies regarding the diﬀerent economic partners possibly aﬀected by their implementation.
Fertilizer producers should ﬁrst see the policy impact on the fertilizer demand (see Figure 8),
and, given a fertilizer abatement target, they undoubtly prefer the miscanthus support policy more
than the tax policy. But isoquants respectively related to the fertilizer abatement and the NO3
abatement quite diﬀer.
The Public Body should focus on substituability between N-tax and perennial crop support,
which signiﬁcantly changes with levels of tax and subsidy (see Figure 9). Let us focus on a 25%
abatement target regarding the NO3 loss. The polar policies are the set “50% tax, 250A C/ha subsidy”
and “100% tax, 75A C/ha subsidy”. In the ﬁrst of these two cases, the fertilizer demand decreasing is
35%. In the second case, the fertilizer demand decreases untill more than 45%.
Farmers obviously prefer the perennial crop support than the N-tax. Figure ?? shows the iso-
income curves related to the agricultural income including the total refund of the tax (as a lumpsum
transfer). In the ﬁrst of the two previous polar cases, this income slightly decreases (-0.5%), much
less than in the second polar case (-0.5%).
Finally under consideration of budget balance on one hand and under consideration of industrial
and agricultural producers on the other hand, the best policy tends to adopt the policy mix {50%
tax, 250A C/ha subsidy}. In this case, the refund of the tax to farmers should not exceed 250MA C(see
Figure ??). In this case, before refund of the tax, the perennial crop support is close to 380 MA Cand


















isoquant: N-fertlizer demand H%, Regions 'fra1'L
Figure 8: Iso-level curves of fertilizer demand abatement














isoquant: N-loss as NO3 H%, Regions 'fra1'L
Figure 9: Iso-level curves of soil-root NO3 abatement
















isoquant - agricultural income incl. tax refund H%, Regions 'fra1'L
Figure 10: Iso-level curves related to farmers proﬁt in-
cluding the tax refund (% of the benchmark) - 14 Regions












isoquant - net public receipt Htax minus support, 109€, Regions 'fra1'L
Figure 11: Iso-level curves of net budget receipt (tax
minus perennial crop subsidy in 109A C) - 14 Regions in the
north of France
95 Concluding remarks
We analyse an environmental policy mix combining N-input tax and energy crop subsidies, using a
quantitative modelling framework based on the suply-side micro-economic model AROPAj and the
crop model STICS. In addition, we used a Faustmann approach allowing us to assess yields and
costs of a perennial crop (miscanthus). We show that a policy mix results in higher N-pollutant
abatments than implementing each single policy instrument (tax or subsidy), but is cost eﬃcient
only for NO3. It is well known that single N-input tax leads to low NO3 abatement with pollution-
price elasticity generally less than 20% for reasonable tax levels. But when tax receipt is partly
transformed into perennial crop support (250A C/ha), a tax close to 50% of N-input price allows
a 25% pollution reduction. These results support some water management stakeholders position
arguing that substitution of agricultural croplands (targeting protein content) by ligno-cellulosic
crops dedicated to dry matter would lower N-pollutions.
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106 Appendix
6.1 Table 1
Tax Miscanthus Soft wheat Maize Other cereals R&T* Oilseed Fodder Fallow Grassland
0.000 0.905 18.920 7.350 16.354 5.836 9.738 8.437 7.879 24.579
0.100 0.895 18.497 7.325 16.581 5.857 9.706 8.414 7.849 24.876
0.200 0.886 18.058 7.351 16.624 5.859 9.599 8.450 7.802 25.370
0.300 1.051 17.300 7.267 16.910 5.875 9.519 8.415 7.665 25.998
0.400 1.045 16.722 7.177 16.717 5.895 9.445 8.592 8.241 26.167
0.500 1.115 16.282 7.131 16.649 5.866 9.153 8.636 8.435 26.733
0.600 1.031 16.179 7.100 16.495 5.882 9.119 8.541 8.541 27.111
0.700 1.021 15.843 6.967 16.363 5.901 9.094 8.661 8.690 27.460
0.800 1.089 14.995 7.274 16.482 5.912 9.027 8.638 8.759 27.824
0.900 2.472 14.367 7.225 16.172 5.898 8.824 8.561 8.385 28.095
1.000 2.521 14.300 7.138 16.087 5.924 8.768 8.485 8.390 28.386
Table 1: Area ( UAA % ) in function of N-fertilizer tax (no subsidy); *
= Root and tubber crops
6.2 Table 2
Subsidy Miscanthus Soft wheat Maize Other cereals R&T * Oilseed Fodder Fallow Grassland
0.000 0.905 18.920 7.350 16.354 5.836 9.738 8.437 7.879 24.579
0.025 1.060 18.886 7.342 16.331 5.836 9.735 8.443 7.825 24.543
0.050 1.216 18.812 7.336 16.285 5.835 9.710 8.440 7.824 24.541
0.075 1.440 18.803 7.320 16.280 5.835 9.709 8.409 7.663 24.540
0.100 3.155 18.145 7.080 16.047 5.805 9.508 8.409 7.309 24.540
0.125 4.279 17.926 7.065 15.459 5.764 9.362 8.355 7.265 24.525
0.150 5.074 17.607 7.000 15.371 5.717 9.268 8.186 7.232 24.545
0.175 5.620 17.305 6.963 15.269 5.700 9.187 8.178 7.232 24.547
0.200 6.275 17.036 6.912 15.150 5.680 9.116 8.151 7.156 24.524
0.225 6.744 16.803 6.903 15.136 5.668 9.058 8.143 7.155 24.391
Table 2: Area (UAA %) in function of Subsidy (no N-fertilizer tax) *=
Root and tubber crops
116.3 Table 3
Figure 12: Surface Area in the case of policy mix
12